What a change?

"Revolutionary Democracy" is substituted by "Developmental Democracy" as the 'core ideology' of ‪#‎EPRDF‬, Bereket Simon reportedly told party members. Does the change involves an ideological or strategic shift? No one knows except few such as Bereket. Who and when decided to make the change? Certainly, we haven't heard if the general assembly of the Front discussed the matter. Such a quite and 'unceremonious' change of 'ideology' or strategy, if it is so, is not new to TPLF, and by extension EPRDF. But how about the multitudes of party members? Do they care? But there must be another reason to explain why the change, which in other cases could have been a big news, took place without much discussion among the cadres and public alike. May be, the change is only in name. What is in name?!

2013 Ethiopia report Human Watch

The sudden death in August 2012 of Ethiopia’s long-serving and powerful prime minister, Meles Zenawi, provoked uncertainty over the country’s political transition, both domestically and among Ethiopia’s international partners. Ethiopia’s human rights record has sharply deteriorated, especially over the past few years, and although a new prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, took office in September, it remains to be seen whether the government under his leadership will undertake human rights reforms.

Ethiopian authorities continued to severely restrict basic rights of freedom of expression, association, and assembly in 2012. Thirty journalists and opposition members were convicted under the country’s vague Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009.The security forces responded to protests by the Muslim community in Oromia and Addis Ababa, the capital, with arbitrary arrests, detentions, and beatings. 

The Ethiopian government continues to implement its “villagization” program: the resettlement of 1.5 million rural villagers in five regions of Ethiopia ostensibly to increase their access to basic services. Many villagers in Gambella region have been forcibly displaced, causing considerable hardship. The government is also forcibly displacing indigenous pastoral communities in Ethiopia’s Lower Omo Valley to make way for state-run sugar plantations.

Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly

Since the promulgation in 2009 of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO Law), which regulates nongovernmental organizations, and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, freedom of expression, assembly, and association have been increasingly restricted in Ethiopia. The effect of these two laws, coupled with the government’s widespread and persistent harassment, threats, and intimidation of civil society activists, journalists, and others who comment on sensitive issues or express views critical of government policy, has been severe.

Ethiopia’s most important human rights groups have been compelled to dramatically  scale-down operations or remove human rights activities from their mandates, and an unknown number of organizations have closed entirely. Several of the country’s most experienced and reputable human rights activists have fled the country due to threats. The environment is equally hostile for independent media: more journalists have fled Ethiopia than any other country in the world due to threats and intimidation in the last decade—at least 79, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation is being used to target perceived opponents, stifle dissent, and silence journalists. In 2012, 30 political activists, opposition party members, and journalists were convicted on vaguely defined terrorism offenses. Eleven journalists have been convicted under the law since 2011.

On January 26, a court in Addis Ababa sentenced both deputy editor Woubshet Taye and columnist Reeyot Alemu of the now-defunct weekly Awramaba Times to 14 years in prison. Reeyot’s sentence was later reduced to five years upon appeal and most of the charges were dropped.

On July 13, veteran journalist and blogger Eskinder Nega, who won the prestigious PEN America Freedom to Write Award in April, was sentenced to 18 years in prison along with other journalists, opposition party members, and political activists. Exiled journalists Abiye Teklemariam and Mesfin Negash were sentenced to eight years each in absentia under a provision of the Anti-Terrorism Law that has so far only been used against journalists. Andualem Arage, a member of the registered opposition party Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), was sentenced to life for espionage, “disrupting the constitutional order,” and recruitment and training to commit terrorist acts. In September, the Ethiopian Federal High Court ordered the property of Eskinder Nega, exiled journalist Abebe Belew, and opposition member Andualem Arage to be confiscated.
On July 20, after the government claimed that reports by the newspaper Feteh on Muslim protests and the prime minister’s health would endanger national security, it seized the entire print run of the paper. On August 24, Feteh’s editor, Temesghen Desalegn was arrested and denied bail. He was released on August 28, and all the charges were withdrawn pending further investigation.
Police on July 20 raided the home of journalist Yesuf Getachew, editor-in-chief of the popular Muslim magazine Yemuslimoche Guday  (Muslim Affairs), and arrested him that night. The magazine has not been published since, and at this writing, Yesuf remained in detention.
On December 27, 2011, two Swedish journalists, Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson, were found guilty of supporting a terrorist organization after being arrested while traveling in eastern Ethiopia with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an outlawed armed insurgent group. They were also convicted of entering the country illegally. The court sentenced them to 11 years in prison. On September 10, they were pardoned and released along with more than 1,950 other prisoners as part of Ethiopia’s annual tradition of amnesty to celebrate the Ethiopian New Year.
On several occasions in July, federal police used excessive force, including beatings, to disperse largely Muslim protesters opposing the government’s interference with the country’s Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs. On July 13, police forcibly entered the Awalia mosque in Addis Ababa, smashing windows and firing tear gas inside the mosque. On July 21, they forcibly broke up a sit-in at the mosque. From July 19 to 21, dozens of people were rounded up and 17 prominent leaders were held without charge for over a week. Many of the detainees complained of mistreatment in detention.

Forced Displacement

The Ethiopian government plans to relocate up to 1.5 million people under its “villagization” program, purportedly designed to improve access to basic services by moving people to new villages in Ethiopia’s five lowland regions: Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), and Somali Region.
In Gambella and in the South Omo Valley, forced displacement is taking place without adequate consultation and compensation. In Gambella, Human Rights Watch found that relocations were often forced and that villagers were being moved from fertile to unfertile areas. People sent to the new villages frequently have to clear the land and build their own huts under military supervision, while the promised services (schools, clinics, water pumps) often have not been put in place.
In South Omo, around 200,000 indigenous peoples are being relocated and their land expropriated to make way for state-run sugar plantations. Residents reported being moved by force, seeing their grazing lands flooded or ploughed up, and their access to the Omo River, essential for their survival and way of life, curtailed.

Extrajudicial Executions, Torture and other Abuses in Detention

An Ethiopian government-backed paramilitary force known as the “Liyu Police” executed at least 10 men who were in their custody and killed 9 other villagers in Ethiopia’s Somali Region on March 16 and 17 following a confrontation over an incident in Raqda village, Gashaamo district.
In April, unknown gunmen attacked a commercial farm owned by the Saudi Star company in Gambella that was close to areas that had suffered a high proportion of abuses during the villagization process. In responding to the attack, Ethiopian soldiers went house to house looking for suspected perpetrators and threatening villagers to disclose the whereabouts of the “rebels.” The military arbitrarily arrested many young men and committed torture, rape, and other abuses against scores of villagers while attempting to extract information.
Human Rights Watch continues to document torture at the federal police investigation center known as Maekelawi in Addis Ababa, as well as at regional detention centers and military barracks in Somali Region, Oromia, and Gambella. There is erratic access to legal counsel and insufficient respect for other due process guarantees during detention, pre-trial detention, and trial phases of politically sensitive cases, placing detainees at risk of abuse.

Treatment of Ethiopian Migrant Domestic Workers

The videotaped beating and subsequent suicide on March 14 of Alem Dechasa-Desisa, an Ethiopian domestic worker in Lebanon, brought increased scrutiny to the plight of tens of thousands of Ethiopian women working in the Middle East. Many migrant domestic workers incur heavy debts and face recruitment-related abuses in Ethiopia prior to employment abroad, where they risk a wide range of abuses from long hours of work to slavery-like conditions (see chapters on the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon).

Key International Actors

Under Meles Zenawi’s leadership, Ethiopia played an important role in regional affairs: deploying UN peacekeepers to Sudan’s disputed Abyei area, mediating between Sudan and South Sudan, and sending troops into Somalia as part of the international effort to combat al-Shabaab. Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbor Eritrea remain poor following the costly border war of 1998-2000. Eritrea accepted the ruling of an independent boundary commission that awarded it disputed territory; Ethiopia did not.
Ethiopia is an important strategic and security ally for Western governments, and the biggest recipient of development aid in Africa. It now receives approximately US$3.5 billion in long-term development assistance each year.  Donor policies do not appear to have been significantly affected by the deteriorating human rights situation in the country.
The World Bank approved a new Country Partnership Strategy in September that takes little account of the human rights or good governance principles that it and other development agencies say are essential for sustainable development. It also approved a third phase of the Protection of Basic Services program (PBS III) without triggering safeguards on involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples.

When I grow up will I go to jail like my dad?

Negash | January 9th, 2014

Ethiopian journalist on prison odyssey needs medical care

By Tom Rhodes/CPJ East Africa Representative

Committee to Protect Journalists

January 9, 2014

Top of Form

Berhane Tesfaye and her son, Fiteh, try to visit Woubshet Taye every week. (CPJ)

Bottom of Form

“When I grow up will I go to jail like my dad?” This was the shattering question that the five-year-old son of imprisoned Ethiopian journalist Woubshet Taye asked his mother after a recent prison visit. Woubshet’s son, named Fiteh (meaning “justice”), has accompanied his mother on a wayward tour of various prisons since his father was arrested in June 2011.

Authorities have inexplicably transferred Woubshet, the former deputy editor of the independent weeklyAwramba Times, to a number of prisons. FromMaekelawi Prison, authorities transferred him to Kality Prison in the capital, Addis Ababa, then to remote Ziway Prison, then Kilinto Prison (just outside Addis Ababa), back to Kality, and in December last year–to Ziway again.

It is at Ziway, an isolated facility roughly 83 miles southeast of the capital, where heat, dust, and contaminated water have likely led to a severe kidney infection in Woubshet. Theaward-winning journalist was meant to receive medical treatment while at Kality Prison in Addis Ababa, Woubshet’s wife, Berhane Tesfaye, told me, but it never took place. Suffering in such pain in his ribs and hip that he cannot sleep, Woubshet has not even received painkillers, according to local journalists who visited him.

CPJ’s attempts to reach Ethiopian government spokesman Shimeles Kemal by phone call and text message were unsuccessful.

Despite high transport costs and more than four hours of travel each way, Berhane and Fiteh try to visit Woubshet every week. Fiteh routinely becomes ill from the dust, Berhane said, and prison guards prevent Woubshet from hugging his son. Prison visits are often brief and canned, local journalists told me, as even discussions over Woubshet’s health are restricted by guards assigned to monitor the conversation.

What terrible misdeeds could have triggered such a fate? Authorities sentenced Woubshet to 14 years in prison on charges lodged under Ethiopia’s broad anti-terrorism law. The evidence includes email exchanges he had with Elias Kifle, exiled Ethiopian editor of the Washington-based opposition website Ethiopian Review, Berhane said. An email to Woubshet’s brother in America was also cited as evidence against him, she said. After Woubshet’s brother asked about their ailing father’s eye operation, his reply that “the operation was done successfully” was used as an example of his terrorist activities.

Local journalists suspect the real reason lies in Woubshet’s critical reporting at Awramba Times. Two weeks prior to his arrest, Woubshet published a column critical of the ruling party’s performance in its two decades of rule. Another column, written in 2009, that questioned the whereabouts of former opposition party members after the 2005 elections may have also triggered his arrest, Berhane said.

While debates over the reasons for Woubshet’s arrest may persist, there is one point on which all sides should agree: Woubshet must be allowed access to medical treatment. Ethiopia is a signatory to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and thus duty-bound to ensure the health of its citizens as a fundamental human right.

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Tom Rhodes is CPJ’s East Africa representative, based in Nairobi. Rhodes is a founder of southern Sudan’s first independent newspaper. Follow him on Twitter: @africamedia_CPJ

Gena and politics

This must be one good occasion to discuss the role of Religion in our politics. As far as the last 20 years are concerned, against a very strong religious background culture, politicians in Ethiopia pretend to “ignore” religion as a mobilizing or even a social factor. Not only the background culture, but also an exploding missionary revivalism characterizes the period. The truth about the dynamics between religion and politics, however, is much different than the official version. Whatever version one may single out to analyze – a statement by the government, a party or a religious institution – the official conviction hardly reflects the reality on the ground.
The ideological footing of all major political groups appears “neutral/disinterested” towards religious views in terms of their ideological disposition. All politicians invoke the name of the Creator whenever it is mandatory, mostly in a manner that appears to be lacking conviction for committed believers. The majority of respondents for a research I conducted in 2009 agreed with the notion of separation of State and Religion. A third of the interviewees, however, were concerned about the lack of “religious conviction” among politicians. But what they really mean by “religious conviction” is another enquiry, which is not the focus of this article. I would rather like to appreciate the place of religion in our politics.
More and more people have become attentive to religious messages, identity and background in the last 20 years. In the early days of the EPRDF, most religious leaders of all major religions used to discourage- directly or indirectly- political activism within the then-political context of Ethiopia, my interviewees asserted. Religious leaders found it wiser to focus on two other areas: evangelism and social cohesion in the aftermath of a long war and under ethnically tense politics. Yet this “disinterest” did not last long, especially when government officials of different religious conviction began to abuse their office in favor of their side. At some point, one of my interviewees concluded, benefiting one’s own religion through public office became a rule rather than an exception. It was during this period, the late 1980s and early 1990s, that the public office became a battleground for religious favoritism. In this case, each side – and particularly proponents of Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Protestantism – will tell us how the followers of the “Other” abuse public office.  Suffice to say that one side can convincingly expose the other on this charge.
However, this abuse of office had never taken a form of party politics or competition for “political power” until the eve of the 2005 Election. I assume that the two years preceding the Election may need special attention to establish what led to the new beginning of “religious-politics.” In the run up to the election, most religious leaders and teachers were encouraging their followers to run for office, contrary to their traditional position of withdrawal. This must be seen as a positive development. However, we should ask how the “innocent disinterested” days ended so abruptly and politics became an active variable both in the intra and inter religious life of the country. Did the religious competition lead them to compete for power so that they could access public resources? Religious competition is basically natural and, in most cases, considered healthy as far as abided by law and norm. Then, were there any external factors to change the chemistry at any particular time? Did religious leaders and followers move towards politics in search of power to win their “spiritual” competition; or did their participation in politics as citizens invite politics into congregation halls? With or without the interest of religious leaders/followers, what if politicians find religion readymade ammunition to attack political opponents? The line between religion and politics is tricky to demarcate in all societies. Where do we find ours?
I must remind my readers here of the fact that the EPRDF had been more interested in controlling the leadership of religious groups and institutions prior to 2005. Only in a few instances did the EPRDF consciously factor politics into the public sphere of religion. Otherwise, its leaders were convinced that controlling the high echelons of all religious institutions, which they successfully did, could keep any possible threat at bay.
It is public knowledge that political parties in the 1960s manipulate religion as a mobilizing factor at different places and times exactly as ancient rulers did. Parties in Eritrea and some parts of Oromiya are famous for consciously giving their political cause a religious dimension. This tradition has not subsided even today.
Fast forward to 2005
Religious institutions and congregations attracted the attention of political groups long before the campaign period. The debates, however, accelerated the speed towards a “scramble for religious groups.” Fortunately, neither the opposition nor the ruling party had a comprehensive strategy to use religion for political mobilization. Initially, the EPRDF was caught by surprise for two reasons. On the one hand, its leaders remained in their delusional comfort zone; on the other hand, they failed to get it right when it comes to the power relations between religious leaders and their followers’ political differences.
The opposition camp found itself defending its “integrity” and respect for religious differences. This does not mean, however, that within the opposition camp there were not any attempts to use religious connections to convince voters. A reliable informant told me that one opposition leader had requested that members of his congregation vote for his party or, and if not, they don’t not vote for one specifically mentioned party. The EPRDF was more bold and malicious in its underground campaign, which was mainly targeted to discredit the CUD. The message, as usual, changed depending on the audience. In the north, the CUD was depicted as a Protestant infested party; in Southern and Western Ethiopia and with Muslim audiences, CUD was colored as a party of “Orthodox extremists.” Such provocative underground campaign messages were very dangerous had it not been for the public rejection. I hope that the EPRDF never dares to repeat this tactic for which it has already paid a price.
The story of religion vs politics did not end there. The EPRDF launched an internal Gimgema of its own to determine the causes of the election debacle. Surprisingly, the role of religious leaders, preachers and some religious groups was identified as a “decisive factor” in some parts of the country. An internal report compiled by the security branch of the Amhara region singled out a religious association belonging to the EOC as the main factor that led opposition candidates to win over their rivals in many rural constituencies. A similar report compiled in Oromia criticized the role of some Islamic clerics and another association and few preachers affiliated with the EOC. The story was not any different in the SNNPS.
Part of the lesson that the EPRDF took from the 2005 election was how to deal with religiously- affiliated individuals and groups. Its increasing control over the leadership of religious institutions is one aspect of the measures taken. The most obtrusive tactic employed in the last five years is infiltrating every inch of seemingly independent space within religious institutions and groups – recruiting all religiously active individuals or convincing them to stay away from politics altogether.
There are a number of incidents that compelled us to think about the place of religion in our politics. The EPRDF remains loyal to its policy of controlling religious leaders outside of their theological controversies. What is the long-term impact of such policies? At a micro level, we have heard that malicious rumors alleging conversion to another religion were spread about Lidetu Ayalew during the recent “election” as part of underground campaign message. Without arguing why Lidetu lost the “election,” the very allegation is indicative of some importance of religion in politics.
Religion remains an important factor in our politics, whether politicians recognize it or not. We should not ignore or avoid religion all together for political, social and national interests. Religious institutions and affiliated groups can play a positive role in supporting democracy and development. They can provide a grassroots level platform for deliberation and exercise of democracy. By the same token, they can be used to suppress people, as Marxists rightly argued. Genna, the birth of Jesus Christ, is about hope. Can our religions give us any hope about our politics?